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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
KNIGHT ADJUSTMENT BUREAU, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROBERT L. WILLIAMS and 
JAMES R. WILLIAMS, 
Defendants. 
Case No. 890418-CA 
Priority No. 14b 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
1. Jurisdiction. The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction 
to consider and hear this appeal pursuant to the provisions of 
Section 78-2-2 Utah Code Annotated, as amended, and Rule 3 of the 
Rules of the Supreme Court of Utah, and pursuant to an Order of the 
Supreme Court of Utah the case was "poured-over to the Court of 
Appeals" the 29th day of June, 1989. 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a judgment signed the 31st day of 
January, 1989, entered the 1st day of February, 1989, (signed by 
the Honorable Douglas L Cornaby, judge in and for the Second 
Judicial District Court) which judgment was granted pursuant to 
Plaintiff's Verified Motion for Entry of Judgment without hearing 
on defendant James Williams1 objection to plaintiff's Motion, and 
which judgment was subsequently amended the 20th day of June, 1989, 
1 
pursuant to plaintiff's Rule 60(a) Motion to Amend, Appellants 
seek review of the judgment and the proceedings leading up to the 
granting of that judgment and the proceedings subsequent thereto 
resulting in the amendment of the judgment; the specific rulings 
of the court being appealed include the Judgment granted the 31st 
day of January, 1989; the Order granting plaintiff's motion to 
amend, entered by the trial court the 21st day of June, 1989; the 
Amended Judgment granted the 20th day and entered the 21st day of 
June, 1989; the trial court's ruling on defendant's motions 
subsequent to the entry of the Amended Judgment identified by the 
trial court as a "Ruling On Motion To Strike" dated the 27th day 
of July, 1989 and the Order based thereon dated the 16th day of 
August, 1989. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
(1) Whether the Court abused its discretion, denied 
defendant due process or otherwise improperly compelled defendant 
James Williams to elect between the risk of contempt of court and 
a jail sentence, or stipulate that he had signed the questioned 
document, 
(2) Whether the Court abused its discretion, denied 
defendant due process or otherwise improperly granted judgment on 
plaintiff's motion where the plaintiff had failed to reduce the 
agreement to writing or otherwise obtain a court order effecting 
the agreement, particularly where the oral agreement was incomplete 
2 
and where plaintiff continued to identify the defendant as Robert 
Williams. 
(3) Whether the Court had jurisdiction to grant an order 
or judgment against Robert Williams. 
(4) Whether the Court could amend a judgment as against 
a party that the original judgment was not sought against. 
(5) Whether the Court abused its discretion in failing 
to consider defendants1 response to plaintiff's motion to amend. 
(6) Whether the Court abused its discretion in signing 
the amended judgment without considering the objections and the 
Rule 60 Motion filed relative thereto. 
(7) Whether the Court abused its discretion or 
alternatively whether it is a denial of due process to deny a party 
against whom a final order is being sought an opportunity for oral 
argument and/or a public hearing. 
(8) Whether the Court committed error in ruling that the 
"error11 of the original judgment was clerical in nature when the 
original motion seeking judgment was directed to Robert Williams 
and not James Williams. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS OR STATUTES 
(See Addendum for verbatim text) 
(1) Casentini v. Hinesy 625 P.2d 1174 (Nevada 1981) 
(2) Dove v. Cudef 710 P.2d 170 (Utah 1985) 
(3) Hiltsley v. Ryder, 738 P.2d 1024 (Utah 1987) 
(4) Kinsman v. Kinsman, 748 P.2d 210 (Utah App. 1988) 
of Utah, 
of Utah. 
(5) Olson v. Idaho Dept. of Water Resources; 666 P.2d 188 
(Idaho 1983) 
(6) Rizzo v. State, 497 N.Y.S.2d 417 (A.D.2 Dept. 1986) 
(7) The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States of America. 
(8) The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States of America. 
(9) Article I Section 1 of the Constitution of the State 
(10) Article I Section 7 of the Constitution of the State 
(11) Rule 36 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(12) Rule 37(c) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(13) Rule 54 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(14) Rule 60(a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(15) Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration. 
(16) Rule 4-501(3) of the Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration. 
(17) Rule 4-504 of the Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
The case below arose out of a claim against Robert L. Williams 
alleging that he was liable for the "open account" debt of the 
corporation "K & W Linoleum Shop, Inc." by virtue of an "agreement" 
Robert Williams had allegedly executed, which document plaintiff 
had attached to its original complaint (Record of proceedings in 
the trial court, at page 3; hereafter referred to as "Record at 
3") . The case against Robert Williams was dismissed and plaintiff 
proceeded against the son of Robert Williams, James R. Williams, 
on the same claim. At the time for pretrial, James Williams and 
counsel were admonished and advised by the court that if James 
persisted in denying that he had signed the "agreement" and 
plaintiff proved at trial he had signed the agreement (which 
signature plaintiff had alleged initially was that of Robert 
Williams, which is illegible and was purportedly signed in 1979 
some nine years earlier, which James Williams had already denied 
in responding to Requests For Admissions and which he told the 
court that he did not recall signing the subject document) the 
court "guaranteed" jail would be imposed (Transcript of April 25, 
1988 pretrial, at page 11 lines 8-9; hereafter "Pretrial at 11, L 
8-9"). 
Thereafter, at the time set for trial, a stipulation of sorts 
was reached. The documents formalizing the stipulation were never 
completed. Plaintiff submitted a motion seeking judgment based 
upon defendant "Robert L. Williams" default; defendant James 
Williams objected to judgment, denied being in default and tendered 
continued performance of the agreement even though plaintiff had 
failed to complete the documents; and without a hearing or notice 
that the matter was being submitted for decision, the court granted 
judgment against Robert L. Williams. Subsequent proceedings 
resulted in the trial court's amendment of the judgment to be 
against James R. Williams. 
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II. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The case below was originally commenced by plaintiff's filing 
an action against Robert L. Williams; the complaint incorporated 
an "agreement" allegedly executed by Robert L. Williams titled 
"application for credit" and was apparently for the benefit of a 
corporation identified as K & W Linoleum Shop, Inc. The basis for 
plaintiff's cause of action was one based upon a debt allegedly 
incurred by the corporation (hereafter referred to as "K & W") 
pursuant to an open account, and one for which plaintiff alleged 
Robert L. Williams had given a personal guarantee (the "agreement" 
attached to plaintiff's complaint, hereafter referred to as 
"agreement"). Plaintiff alleged that Robert L. Williams was liable 
for the debt of "K & W" in a sura in excess of $30,000.00. 
The complaint was later dismissed and plaintiff's motion to 
amend to name James R. Williams as defendant was granted; 
substituting James R. Williams as the party plaintiff was claiming 
was liable for the open account debt of "K & W" based upon the same 
document, the "agreement" attached to the original complaint. 
At the time set for trial, the parties discussed settlement 
and an understanding was arrived at, which settlement amounted to 
defendant James R. Williams' agreement to pay plaintiff the total 
sum of $16,601.50 over a two year period, the unpaid balance to 
carry interest at 11% and monthly payments estimated to be $500.00 
per month (Transcript of proceedings on the 16th day of September, 
1988, at page 3 lines 8 through 20; hereafter referred to as Trial-
T at 3, L 8-20). Some details of the "stipulation" remained to be 
worked out and there were multiple recesses wherein the trial court 
retired to permit the parties to negotiate further; i. e. at page 
6 line 25 (Trial-T) the court states: "Let me get out of your 
negotiation. You chat with each other. Let me know when you're 
ready for me to come back in." 
The September 16 proceeding concluded with plaintiff's counsel 
representing to the court that she would "draw the documents." 
(Trial-T at 7, L 24) Thereafter plaintiff's counsel submitted 
multiple drafts of a stipulation purportedly representing that 
reached in court; in addition to calculation errors (orf at the 
least, conflicts between counsel as to the correct amount of the 
monthly payments) plaintiff's drafts all incorrectly identified the 
defendant party as "Robert L. Williams" who is the father of James 
R. Williams. Even though James Williams had already tendered 
$5,000.00 toward the settlement, for very obvious reasons counsel 
for defendants could not agree to or execute a stipulation binding 
Robert instead of James Williams. 
Thereafter, plaintiff filed a verified motion seeking judgment 
against Robert L. Williams, defendant objected, the court granted 
plaintiff's motion and signed a judgment and both defendants joined 
in an appeal therefrom. Plaintiff subsequently moved the Supreme 
Court to amend the judgment based upon Rule 60(a) Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure and the Supreme Court remanded the case to the 
trial court to allow plaintiff to seek the relief requested 
pursuant to Rule 60(a). In the meantime the Supreme Court caused 
the case to be poured over to the Court of Appeals. 
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On remand to the trial court, plaintiff filed the Rule 60 
motion and defendants filed a response, asserting, inter alia, that 
the judgment should not be amended. (Record at 65-68) The trial 
court granted plaintiff's motion and signed an amended judgment 
against James Williams without hearing. Defendant submitted a Rule 
60(b) Motion along with other pleadings seeking relief from the 
amended judgment and a hearing on the matters raised, which motions 
were denied. 
III. DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT 
Judgment was entered against Robert L. Williams the 31st day 
of January, 1989 and subsequently amended to be against James R. 
Williams the 21st day of June, 1989. 
IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
(1) On or about May 21, 1986, plaintiff commenced the 
above entitled action against Robert L. Williams, alleging inter 
alia that Robert L. Williams had executed an agreement to 
"guarantee" the payment of the debts of a third-party K & W 
Linoleum Inc., to Robinson Distributing Co., Inc. (Record 1-2). 
(2) On or about the 13th day of August, 1987 the Second 
Judicial District Court, per the Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby 
ordered the dismissal of plaintiff's causes of action against 
Robert L. Williams and granted leave to plaintiff to file an 
amended complaint against James R. Williams alleging that he had 
signed the "guarantee." (Both defendants have and continue to deny 
the document purportedly executed in 1979 constituted a guarantee 
Q 
or agreement to pay the debts of K & W Linoleum, Inc.)(Record 9-
11). 
(3) That at pre-trial before the Honorable Douglas L 
Cornaby on the 25th day of April, 1988, the Court informed James 
R. Williams personally and his counsel that despite defendant's 
denial that he had executed the document that plaintiff alleges 
constitutes a "guarantee;" that if the defendant persisted in 
requiring the plaintiff to prove that the signature it had 
initially alleged was Robert Williams was that of James Williams, 
that "I want to guarantee that you, as counsel, you may go to 
jail..." (Transcript page 11, Line 9, April 25, 1988 pre-trial.) 
(4) That based upon the Court's threatening contempt and 
jail if defendant failed to prevail on the issue of the identity 
of the person signing the subject document some nine years prior, 
defendant subsequently and reluctantly withdrew his denial relative 
thereto and by way of a pre-trial order stipulated that he signed 
the subject document.(Record 30-32). 
(5) That at the time set for trial the parties then 
involved in the action, Knight Adjustment Bureau, Robinson 
Distributing Co., Inc. and James R. Williams reached an 
understanding described as a "stipulation," the general nature of 
which was put on the record orally in fragments broken by further 
discussion, modification and off-the-record negotiations. (Trial 
Transcript). 
(6) That as a result of the understanding it was agreed 
that the case be settled upon terms and conditions that were 
understood in theory but not in detail: i.e. an approximate monthly 
payment over a specific time period was to be made but the exact 
amount of the monthly payments was subject to calculation. (Trial 
Transcript). 
(7) Plaintiff was to prepare the documents that would 
set forth with specificity the "stipulation" together with an 
appropriate order for the court. (Trial at 7). 
(8) Plaintiff failed to accurately prepare a written 
stipulation consistent with the oral stipulation, including 
initially an error in calculating the payment amounts and most 
significantly identifying the subject defendant as Robert L. 
Williams who had been dismissed from the lawsuit more than a year 
prior, which errors were repeatedly pointed out to counsel for 
plaintiff. (Record 36-37, 40-41). 
(9) Defendant James R. Williams made an initial payment 
of $5,000.00 despite the failure of plaintiff to prepare an 
accurate written stipulation, to demonstrate a good faith effort 
to perform according to the agreement: (Record 36-37, 38-39). 
(10) That despite the failure of plaintiff to prepare 
the documents as plaintiff had stipulated to preparing, and despite 
the lack of a written stipulation or other documentation setting 
forth payment amounts and due dates, plaintiff filed a "Verified 
Motion For Entry of Judgment" seeking entry of judgment for the 
amount prayed for in the complaint based on defendant's failure to 
timely pay pursuant to the "stipulation" reached in court. A copy 
of that motion is included in the addendum hereto. (Record 38-39). 
(11) That defendant James R. Williams responded by 
filing an Objection to plaintiff's motion, filed the 27th day of 
January, 1989; defendant's objection is included in the addendum 
hereto, (Record 36-37) . 
(12) That the Court apparently granted plaintiff's motion 
and signed a judgment against Robert Williams the 31st day of 
January, 1989, and same was filed the 1st day of February, 1989. 
(13) That plaintiff rejected further tender of payments 
pursuant to the oral stipulation. 
(14) That plaintiff filed a Motion to amend judgment 
pursuant to Rule 60(a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, alleging that 
there was a "clerical" error in the original judgment. (Record 54) . 
(15) That defendants filed a Response to plaintiff's 
Motion to amend and objected to such amendment on the grounds, 
inter alia, that the "error" was not "clerical" but substantive, 
and that no verified motion had been filed against James Williams. 
(Record 56-58). 
(16) That on May 26, 1989 the Court ruled that the 
"attorneys for the defendant, James R. Williams, do not object to 
the amendment" and granted the motion to amend. (Record 61). 
(17) That defendants timely submitted, on June 15th, 
1989, an Objection to the proposed judgment submitted by 
plaintiff's counsel; a Rule 60(b) Motion and a Memorandum in 
support of defendants' Objection and Motion were submitted 
concurrently with the Objection. (Record 63-68) . 
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(18) That the Court executed the proposed judgment on 
the 20th day of June without further proceedings, hearing or notice 
to the parties. (Record 70) • 
(19) That no notice of entry of judgment thereafter was 
served in contradiction of Rule 58A of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure and Rule 4-504 of the Rules of Judicial Administration. 
(20) That defendants' Objection and Rule 60(b) Motion, 
together with defendants' Motion to Strike plaintiff's response 
to the objection and Rule 60(b) motion (as non-responsive) , were 
denied pursuant to the trial court's ruling the 27th day of July 
1989. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defendant James R. Williiams was denied due process of law at 
several stages of the proceedings below, his arguments were either 
ignored or overlooked, his pleadings were either ignored or 
disregarded, the trial court appears to have made some unfounded 
or unsupported conclusions about the merits of James Williams' 
defenses and accordingly denied James Williams an opportunity to 
be fairly heard. The trial court seemed at several stages of the 
proceedings to be unfamiliar with both the substantive and the 
procedural aspects of the case, including confusion as to the 
identity of parties involved at the April 1988 pretrial, the nature 
of plaintiff's claims (the court seemed to overlook that plaintiff 
was alleging an obligation to pay the debt of a third, corporate 
party) and the nature of the defenses raised. Commencing with the 
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court threatening the sanction of jail on issues that defendant 
James Williams might fail to prevail on at trial, the court 
conveyed to James Williams that it strongly favored the claims of 
plaintiff. 
When plaintiff alleged that defendant Robert Williams was in 
default of a stipulation reached in court the day scheduled for 
trial, the trial court granted plaintiff's motion without reading 
or considering the objections raised by defendants, on the fourth 
day after defendants filed their response, without notice to 
defendants that the matter had been submitted for decision and 
without allowing defendants an opportunity to request a hearing. 
When the matter was remanded to the trial court, to allow the 
plaintiff to request relief pursuant to Rule 60(a) to amend the 
judgment because of a "clerical" error, the trial court again 
either did not read or consider the response of defendants, granted 
plaintiff's motion without notice that the matter was submitted for 
decision and without opportunity for defendants to request a 
hearing. Pursuant thereto, the trial court granted judgment 
against James R. Williams based upon a verified motion against 
Robert L. Williams, which motion the trial court later describes 
also as a "clerical error." 
At the time the parties appeared for trial and a "stipulation" 
was reached, the 16th day of September, 1988, law and motion 
practice was still governed by the former Rules of Practice; 
subsequent thereto and prior to the plaintiff's filing of a 
verified motion seeking judgment the rules set forth in the Utah 
1^ 
Code of Judicial Administration took effect, particularly Rule 4-
501 and more specifically Rule 4-501(9) which allows the resisting 
party ten days in which to request a hearing after the clerk has 
been notified to submit the matter for decision. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN 
GRANTING PLAINTIFF1S VERIFIED MOTION 
FOR JUDGMENT 
The parties appeared at the trial court the 16th day of 
September, 1988, at the time scheduled for trial. Counsel for the 
plaintiff represented to the court that the parties had reached a 
"settlement agreement" (Trial at 3, L 8) and outlined the terms to 
the court. Questions arose, however, and further discussions were 
held off the record (Trial at 4, L 2-3), the parties went back on 
the record and there were additional "misunderstandings" and again 
the court went off the record, stating "Let me get out of your 
negotiation." (Trial at 6, L 25, emphasis added) The parties 
subsequently stated, on the record, that they understood what the 
agreement contemplated and the court stated it accepted the 
agreement; counsel for plaintiff represented in closing (at 7, L 
24) "I'll draw the documents, your Honor." 
Rule 4-504 Utah Rules of Judicial Administration provides as 
follows: 
(1) In all rulings by a court, counsel for the party or 
parties obtaining the ruling shall within fifteen (15) 
days, or within a shorter time as the court may direct, 
file with the court a proposed order, judgment, or decree 
in conformity with the ruling. 
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(3) Stipulated settlements and dismissals shall also be 
reduced to writing and presented to the court for 
signature within fifteen (15) days of the settlement and 
dismissal. 
Plaintiff failed to "draw the documents" within the time prescribed 
and then, at a later time, plaintiff drafted and submitted to 
counsel for defendants a "stipulation" that was not in conformity 
with the agreement (See Record at 40-41 and defendant's objection 
paragraphs 4, 5, and 6 at Record 36-37) but had substituted Robert 
Williams as the party responsible in place of James Williams (there 
were additional albeit minor discrepancies as to details like dates 
payments were due and their exact amount); for obvious reasons 
counsel for defendant would not execute plaintiff's drafted 
stipulation. In the meantime defendant James Williams had tendered 
$5,000.00 to plaintiff toward the settlement. 
Plaintiff subsequently submitted a Verified Motion For Efntry 
of Judgment, as against Robert L. Williams, (Record at 38) alleging 
inter alia that defendant had defaulted and that plaintiff was 
entitled to judgment for $52,050.77. Plaintiff's mailing 
certificate indicates that counsel for plaintiff caused a copy of 
said motion to be mailed to counsel for defendant the 17th day of 
January, 1989. (Record at 42) Defendant timely filed a response 
entitled Objection To Motion For Entry Of Judgment (Record at 36); 
defendant's response was brief and to the point, barely a page and 
a half in length, explicitly pointing out, inter alia, that 
plaintiff was pursuing the wrong defendant and that James Williams 
was ready and able to tender performance but for plaintiff's 
1 R 
failure to agree as to the responsible party and the specific terms 
(dates payments due and exact amounts, etc)• 
No notice to submit the matter for decision was submitted 
pursuant to Rule 4-501(8) Utah Rules of Judicial Administration, 
which provides, in part, "If a hearing is not requested by the 
Court, counsel shall notify the Clerk of the Court, in writing, to 
submit the motion to the Court for decision." On January 31, 1989, 
without allowing defendants an opportunity pursuant to Rule 4-
501(9) Utah Rules of Judicial Administration to request a hearing 
and without defendant's waiver of the right to a hearing the trial 
court granted judgment against Robert L. Williams. (Record at 45) 
Settlements and stipulations are, of course, encouraged by the 
courts pursuant to well worn principles of judicial economy and 
there is a presumption as to stipulations whose terms are definite 
and which are either made in writing or in open court upon the 
record, that such stipulations are enforceable absent their being 
set aside for justifiable cause. See Casentini v. Hines, 625 P.2d 
1174 (Nevada 1981), Dove v. Cude, 710 P.2d 170 (Utah 1985), 
Hiltsley v. Ryder, 738 P.2d 1024 (Utah 1987), Kinsman v. Kinsman, 
748 P.2d 210 (Utah App. 1988) and Rizzo v. State, 497 N.Y.S.2d 417 
(A.D.2 Dept. 1986). Stipulations and settlements, however, are no 
more than a form of contract (Olson v. Idaho Dept. of Water 
Resources, 666 P.2d 188 (Idaho 1983)) and their enforcement is 
subject to applicable principles of contract law. 
In the case now before the court, the "stipulation" was not 
specifically read into the record, but consisted of commentary, 
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representations, discussions and questions between the court and 
counsel for the parties, broken by at least two separate occasions 
where the parties and/or counsel had discussions and negotiations 
off the record. It was clearly contemplated that the "stipulation" 
would be reduced to writing. Given the piecemeal, and sometimes 
incomprehensible, manner in which the agreement was presented to 
the court, and recognizing that the parties had a firm 
understanding as to the total amount and total time period in which 
the payments were to be made ($15,601.50 to be paid within two 
years), it is entirely reasonable to conclude that defendant not 
only could anticipate that the specific terms would be specified 
in a writing (that plaintiff's counsel was to prepare) but that he 
could have such a writing to refer to and rely upon in carrying out 
performance of the agreement, and that he could not be charged with 
failing to perform until those specific terms were set forth in a 
writing. 
Rule 4-504(3) Utah Rules of Judicial Administration has an 
obvious purpose, inter alia, and that is to avoid exactly the 
difficulty that arose here: if and when the stipulation is timely 
reduced to writing, subsequent enforcement of the stipulation if 
necessary is simple and straight forward. In this case, however, 
the party charged with preparing the writing failed to do so and 
in fact prepared a draft inconsistent with the agreement in a 
particularly important detail: the identity of the party bound 
thereby, and then sought to enforce the agreement as it had been 
incompletely and piecemeal and with obvious contemplation that it 
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would be reduced to writing, presented in open court; the same 
party declined to accept James Williams1 tender of performance. 
A natural prerequisite to enforcement of an oral stipulation, 
particularly one that is not read into the record as an integrated 
whole but whose terms are broken by off-the-record negotiations, 
is compliance with Rule 4-504(3) Utah Rules of Judicial 
Administration; it is not contested that the fifteen day period 
specified in the rule is absolute, but before a party can seek 
enforcement, particularly the party charged with the obligation to 
comply with the rule, the stipulation should be reduced to writing 
and an order granted adopting the stipulation as binding upon the 
parties. The trial court herein erred in granting plaintiff 
judgment in these circumstances. 
Additionally, and perhaps an even more aggravating denial of 
due process, as guaranteed by both the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States and by Article 1 Sections 1 and 
7 of the Constitution of the State of Utah, the trial court erred 
in failing to allow defendants an opportunity tp be heard prior to 
judgment being entered. Pursuant to Rule 4-501 Utah Rules of 
Judicial Administration defendant had (including time for mailing) 
until the 30th day of January 1989 to submit a response, then 
plaintiff would have five days to reply, after which one of the 
parties should give notice to submit for decision; defendant would 
have ten days from that notice to request a hearing. The defendant 
submitted his objection the 27th day of January, 1989. The court, 
however, proceeded to grant judgment against Robert L. Williams the 
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31st day of January 1989. Clearly, defendants were not given an 
adequate opportunity to be heard; simple due process demands an 
opportunity to appear before the court prior to the granting of a 
judgment in excess of $50,000.00. The trial court committed error 
in failing to allow defendants an opportunity for a hearing before 
the court. 
Finally, on this point, it is also clear that defendant's 
objection was either overlooked, ignored or disregarded. The 
record was absolutely clear, but for plaintiff's rendering of the 
stipulation and the identification of Robert Williams as the 
defendant in the verified motion, that Robert Williams was not an 
involved party at that time, and in precise, simple language 
defendant pointed out that error in his objection. Despite the 
explicit and absolutely accurate point of paragraph 3 of 
defendant's objection (Record at 36) the trial court granted 
judgment against Robert Williams! It is apparent that the trial 
court did not consider defendant's pleading and thereby denied 
defendant due process, 
POINT II: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN 
GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO AMEND 
JUDGMENT 
The trial court erred in granting judgment in the first 
instance, as is argued above in Point I, and therefore that 
judgment should not have been subsequently amended. Additionally, 
however, plaintiff's motion to amend was specifically based upon 
Rule 60(a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure seeking correction of a 
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clerical error. Plaintiff's verified motion itself, together with 
the stipulation that plaintiff drafted, identified the defendant 
party as Robert Williams; Robert Williams had indeed been a party 
defendant previously dismissed from the lawsuit. Plaintiff did 
not seek judgment against James Williams in the verified motion. 
Perhaps counsel for James Williams is missing some intricacies of 
the law that counsel has not had experience withf but it seems 
incongruous on its face that a judgment granted based upon a 
verified motion against one party (i.e. Robert Williams) can 
subsequently be amended on the basis of a clerical error to be a 
judgment against another party (i.e. James Williams); that is, how 
can the Court grant a judgment against James Williams, by way of 
a Rule 60(a) motion or otherwise, when there was no motion against 
James Williams to begin with? 
Obviously plaintiff juxtaposed the identities of the parties; 
defendant pointed that out in clear and unequivocal language 
before the original judgment had been granted. Was James Williams 
and his counsel charged with the duty to respond to the original 
motion as if it named James Williams? Was James Williams bound by 
the proceedings directed to his father, Robert Williams, as if 
they had been directed against him? It was error, clearly. It 
was plaintiff s error, clearly. It may have originated as a 
clerical mistake in plaintiff's office, but one cannot imagine a 
more substantive matter than the identity of a party, and as 
plaintiff persisted, despite being informed of the error, in 
proceeding against Robert Williams that does not put James 
90 
Williams on adequate notice. Plaintiff sought a judgment against 
Robert Williams and the court erroneously granted a judgment 
against Robert Williams; it was not a clerical error at that 
point: at the least it was an inadvertent oversight or the result 
of negligence; it may have been more deliberate than that, 
however, as the father, Robert Williams, was the party with assets 
and the financial ability to satisfy the claim. 
The trial court effectively granted an amendment to 
plaintiff's verified motion to have it directed against James 
Williams and a judgment based upon that against James Williams. 
(See trial court's ruling dated July 27, 1989, Record at 90-92, 
where the court stated: "This court is convinced that plaintiff's 
'verified Motion for Entry of Judgment1 was a clerical error.") 
That alone is sufficient to demonstrate that the identification of 
parties in the judgment was not clerical error but arose from an 
error in plaintiff's motionl The result was to deny James 
Williams an opportunity to be heard on the merits! 
POINT III: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN 
COMPELLING DEFENDANT TO ELECT 
BETWEEN THE RISK OF JAIL OR 
STIPULATE THAT IT WAS HIS SIGNATURE 
ON A SUBJECT DOCUMENT 
Prior to the April 1988 pretrial, plaintiff had served 
requests for admissions upon the defendant James Williams, 
including a request that James Williams admit that he signed 
Exhibit A attached to plaintiff's complaint. The document had 
been allegedly signed by Robert Williams according to plaintiff's 
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first complaint. It appeared to have been executed some nine 
years previous. The document, while it speaks for itself, is in 
part illegible and contains blanks and portions not completed. 
There is no identification of the individual that apparently did 
sign the document. (A copy is included in the addendum hereto.) 
James Williams denied that it was his signature. He did so 
after receiving instruction from his legal counsel as to his 
obligations in responding to the discovery, including advise that 
he should respond truthfully according to his knowledge and 
belief, that it was not necessary to speculate but that if he 
denied facts and plaintiff was able to prevail upon proving those 
facts at trial he was subject to various sanctions as provided for 
in Rule 36 and Rule 37 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Counsel for 
defendant reiterated at pretrial that James Williams contested the 
issue of whether the document amounted to a guarantee, contested 
the issue of whether it bore his signature and contested the issue 
of whether plaintiff had ever relied upon James Williams in 
extending "K & W" credit (particularly as plaintiff had initially 
alleged it relied upon Robert Williams in extending the credit). 
Counsel for James Williams advised the court that the matter 
of sanctions had been reviewed with the defendant, "We reviewed 
that with Mr. Williams but we contest that issue." To which the 
court responded: 
That's fine. But, you understand if he says it 
looks like my signature and it looks like all 
other signatures, I want to guarantee that 
you, as counsel, you may go to jail if you 
just waste our time in there. (Pretrial at 11, 
L 5-9) 
The sanction of jail is not an appropriate sanction for the failure 
of a party to admit a fact that an opposing party may be able to 
prevail on at trial. The difficulty in this case was the fact that 
the court did not even recognize who the proper parties were at the 
beginning of the pretrial, the court wanted to know why James 
Williams was present and not Robert Williams (Pretrial at 2); the 
court was apparently not well familiar with status of the case and 
yet it wanted to put the defendant on trial there, in chambers. 
A cursory review of the subject document together with the fact 
that it was nine years old, together with the fact that plaintiff 
had alleged that another had signed the document initially, 
together with the defendant's good faith representation that he had 
no recollection of signing that document, should have been 
sufficient for the court to defer to the fact finding process 
(rather than interrogation with risk of incarceration) on that 
issue. It put counsel and his client in an awkward, difficult, if 
not impossible situation; James Williams left that pretrial with 
the distinct impression that the court was compelling him to agree 
that he signed the document whether he had or not. 
It is not unusual for a trial court to express some assessment 
of various factual and legal issues in the course of a pretrial, 
particularly if it will assist in settlement negotiations; in this 
instance, however, the court went beyond the bounds of its 
discretion, gave an indication of its inclination even though 
little of the evidence had been presented or argued, and threatened 
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jail if defendant failed to prevail on an issue of fact. The court 
had apparently taken sides in the case and the defendant was 
apprehensive of the court and of what the court might do, including 
but not limited to possibly imposition of jail sentences. The 
court's demeanor, statements, and threats were inappropriate and 
constituted error. Defendant was coerced by the court's demeanor 
and threats into admitting what he challenged to be the truth. 
Defendant's right to a fair and impartial hearing were thus denied. 
Defendant's right to due process was thus denied. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court below repeatedly denied James Williams an 
opportunity to be heard, from the coercion to stipuLate that he had 
signed the credit application, to the failure to comply with Rule 
4-501 Utah Rules of Judicial Administration and granting 
plaintiff's verified motion without hearing or an opportunity for 
defendant to request a hearing, to the trial court's sua sponte 
amendment of plaintiff's verified motion and granting of an amended 
judgment based upon that. The lack of a written stipulation or an 
order reflecting and adopting the oral stipulation was due to 
plaintiff's negligence, in part, and in plaintiff's persistence in 
placing Robert Williams name as the responsible party. James 
Williams had tendered performance which plaintiff rejected (see 
defendant's objection Record at 36). The totality of circumstances 
reflect a denial of due process and reversible error. The amended 
judgment should be reversed and ordered set aside. 
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Respectfully submitted this M day of^November, 1989. 
William H. Lindsley 
Attorney for Defendants/Appellants 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing to 
Kathryn S. Denholm, 263 East 2100 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84115, this •\t day of S er, 1989. 
ADDENDUM 
ADDENDUM 
TE ; •' DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES 
United States Constitution, Fifth Amendment 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise 
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand 
Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in 
the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public 
danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be 
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in 
any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation. 
United States Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United 
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make 
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws. 
Constitution of Utah, Article I Section 1 
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy and 
defend their lives and liberties; to acquire, possess and protect 
property; to worship according to the dictates of their 
consciences; to assemble peaceably, protest against wrongs, and 
petition for redress of grievances; to communicate freely their 
thoughts and opinions, being responsible for the abuse of that 
right. 
Constitution of Utah, Article 1 Section 7 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, 
without due process of law. 
Rule 36. Request for admission. 
(a) Request for admission. A party may serve upon any other party a 
written request for the admission, for purpose of the pending action only, of 
the truth of any matters within the scope of Rule 26(b) set forth in the request 
that relate to statements or opinions of fact or of the application of law to fact, 
including the genuineness of any documents described in the request. The 
request for admission shall contain a notice advising the party to whom the 
request is made that, pursuant to Rule 36, the matters shall be deemed admit-
ted unless said request is responded to within 30 days after service of the 
request or within such shorter or longer time as the court may allow. Copies of 
documents shall be served with the request unless they have been or are 
otherwise furnished or made available for inspection and copying. The request 
may, without leave of court, be served upon the plaintiff after commencement 
of the action and upon any other party with or after service of the summons 
and complaint upon that party. 
Each matter of which an admission is requested shall be separately set 
forth. The matter is admitted unless, within thirty days after service of the 
request, or within such shorter or longer time as the court may allow, the 
party to whom the request is directed serves upon the party requesting the 
admission a written answer or objection addressed to the matter, signed by 
the party or by his attorney, but, unless the court shortens the time, a defen-
dant shall not be required to serve answers or objections before the expiration 
of 45 days after service of the summons and complaint upon him. If objection 
is made, the reasons therefor shall be stated. The answer shall specifically 
deny the matter or set forth in detail the reasons why the answering party 
cannot truthfully admit or deny the matter. A denial shall fairly meet the 
substance of the requested admission, and when good faith requires that a 
party qualify his answer or deny only a part of the matter of which an admis-
sion is requested, he shall specify so much of it as is true and qualify or deny 
the remainder. An answering party may not give lack of information or 
knowledge as a reason for failure to admit or deny unless he states that he has 
made reasonable inquiry and that the information known or readily obtain-
able by him is insufficient to enable him to admit or deny. A party who 
considers that a matter of which an admission has been requested presents 3 
genuine issue for trial may not, on that ground alone, object to the request; he 
may, subject to the provisions of Rule 37(c), deny the matter or set forth 
treasons wfry he cannot admit or deny it. 
The party who has requested the admissions may move to determine the 
sufficiency of the answers or objections. Unless the court determines that an 
objection is justified, it shall order that an answer be served. If the court 
determines that an answer does not comply with the requirements of this rule, 
it may order either that the matter is admitted or that an amended answer be 
served. The court may, in lieu of these orders, determine that final disposition 
of the request be made at a pretrial conference or at a designated time prior to 
trial. The provisions of Rule 37(a)(4) apply to the award of expenses incurred 
in relation to the motion. 
(b) Effect of admission. Any matter admitted under this rule is conclu-
sively established unless the court on motion permits withdrawal or amend-
ment of the admission. Subject to the provisions of Rule 16 governing amend-
ment of a pretrial order, the court may permit withdrawal or amendment 
when the presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved thereby 
and the party who obtained the admission fails to satisfy the court that with-
drawal or amendment will prejudice him in maintaining his action or defense 
on the merits. Any admission made by a party under this rule is for the 
purpose of the pending action only and is not an admission by him for any 
other purpose nor may it be used against him in any other proceeding. 
(Amended, effective Jan. 1, 1987.) 
Rule 37(c) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
If a party fails to admit the genuineness of any document or 
the truth of any matter as requested under Rule 36/ and if the 
party requesting the admissions thereafter proves the genuineness 
of the document or the truth of the matter, he may apply to the 
court for an order requiring the other party to pay him the 
reasonable expenses incurred in making that proof, including 
reasonable attorney's fees. The court shall make the order unless 
it finds that (1) the request was held objectionable pursuant to 
Rule 36(a), or (2) the admission sought was of no substantial 
importance, or (3) the party failing to admit had reasonable ground 
to believe that he might prevail on the matter, or (4) there was 
other good reason for the failure to admit* 
Rule 54. Judgments; costs. 
(a) Definition; form. "Judgment" as used in these rules includes a decree 
and any order from which an appeal lies. A judgment need not contain a 
recital of pleadings, the report of a master, or the record of prior proceedings. 
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and/or involving multiple parties. 
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a 
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, and/or when multiple 
parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to 
one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express 
determination by the court that there is no just reason for delay and upon an 
express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determina-
tion and direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated, 
which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of 
fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the 
claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision 
at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the 
rights and liabilities of all the parties. 
(c) Demand for judgment 
(1) Generally. Except as to a party against whom a judgment is en-
tered by default, every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the 
party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not 
demanded such relief in his pleadings. It may be given for or against one 
or more of several claimants; and it may, when the justice of the case 
requires it, determine the ultimate rights of the parties on each side as 
between or among themselves. 
(2) Judgment by default. A judgment by default shall not be different 
in kind from, or exceed in amount, that specifically prayed for in the 
demand for judgment. 
(d) Costs. 
(1) To whom awarded. Except when express provision therefor is 
made either in a statute of this state or in these rules, costs shall be 
allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise 
directs; provided, however, where an appeal or other proceeding for re-
view is taken, costs of the action, other than costs in connection with such 
appeal or other proceeding for review, shall abide the final determination 
of the cause. Costs against the state of Utah, its officers and agencies 
shall be imposed only to the extent permitted by law. 
(2) How assessed. The party who claims his costs must within five 
days after the entry of judgment serve upon the adverse party against 
whom costs are claimed, a copy of a memorandum of the items of his costs 
and necessary disbursements in the action, and file with the court a like 
memorandum thereof duly verified stating that to affiant's knowledge the 
items are correct, and that the disbursements have been necessarily in-
curred in the action or proceeding. A party dissatisfied with the costs 
claimed may, within seven days after service of the memorandum of costs, 
file a motion to have the bill of costs taxed by the court in which the 
judgment was rendered. 
A memorandum of costs served and filed after the verdict, or at the 
time of or subsequent to the service and filing of the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, but before the entry of judgment, shall nevertheless be 
considered as served and filed on the date judgment is entered. 
(3), (4) [Deleted.] 
(e) Interest and costs to be included in the judgment. The clerk must 
include in any judgment signed by him any interest on the verdict or decision 
from the time it was rendered, and the costs, if the same have t>een taxed or 
ascertained. The clerk must, within two days after the costs have been taxed 
or ascertained, in any case where not included in the judgment, insert the 
amount thereof in a blank left in the judgment for that purpose, and make a 
similar notation thereof in the register of actions and in the judgrpent docket. 
(Amended effective January 1, 1985). 
Rule 60(a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record 
and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may be 
corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the 
motion of any party and after such notice, if any, as the court 
orders. During the pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so 
corrected before the appeal is docketed in the appellate court, and 
thereafter while the appeal is pending may be so corrected with 
leave of the appellate court. 
Rule 4-50 L Motions. 
Intent: 
To establish a uniform procedure for filing motions, supporting memoranda 
and documents with the court. 
To establish a uniform procedure for providing courtesy copies of motions 
and supporting documentation to the court. 
To establish a uniform procedure for ensuring timely and adequate notice of 
matters placed on the law and motion calendar and set for hearing. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to all district and circuit courts. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) All motions, except uncontested or ex-parte matters, shall be accompa-
nied by a brief statement of points and authorities and affidavits relied upon 
in support thereof. Points and authorities supporting or opposing a motion 
shall not exceed five (5) pages in length exclusive of the "statement of mate-
rial facts" as provided in paragraphs (4) and (5), except as waived by order of 
the court on ex-parte application If an ex-parte application is made to file an 
over-length memorandum, the application shall state the length of the memo-
randum, and if the memorandum is in excess of ten pages, the application 
shall include a summary of the memorandum, not to exceed five pages. If a 
memorandum of points and authorities is filed in support of a motion, it must 
be served on the opposing party or counsel and filed with the court no later 
than ten (10) days before the date set for hearing. 
(2) The responding party shall file and serve upon all parties within ten 
(10) days after service of a motion, but no later than five (5) days before the 
date of hearing, a statement answering points and authorities and counter-
aflldavits. 
(3) The moving party may serve and file reply points and authorities within 
five (5) days after service of the responding party's points and authorities. 
Upon the expiration of the five (5) day period to file reply points and authori-
ties, either party may notify the Clerk to submit the matter for decision. 
(4) The points and authorities in support of a motion for summary judg-
ment shall begin with a section that contains a concise statement of material 
facts as to which movant contends no genuine issue exists. The facts shall be 
stated in separate numbered sentences and shall refer with particularity to 
those portions of the record upon which the movant relies. 
Rule 4-501. Motions. (cont inued) 
(5) The points and authorities in opposition to a motion for summary judg-
ment shall begin with a section that contains a concise statement of material 
facts as to which the party contends a genuine issue exists. Each disputed fact 
shall be stated in separate numbered sentences and shall refer with particu-
larity to those portions of the record upon which the opposing party relies, 
and, if applicable, shall state the numbered sentence or sentences of the mov-
ant's facts that are disputed. All material facts set forth in the movant's 
statement shall be deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment 
unless specifically controverted by the opposing party's statement. 
(6) A copy of the motion, supporting memorandum and documents shall be 
filed with the clerk's office as provided in the Rules of Civil Procedure. Mo-
tions based upon depositions or supported thereby shall not be heard unless 
the depositions are filed in the clerk's office at least two working days before 
the hearing unless otherwise ordered by the court upon good cause shown. 
(7) A courtesy copy of the motion, memorandum of points and authorities 
and documents supporting or opposing the motion shall be delivered to the 
judge hearing the matter at least two working days before the date set for 
hearing. Courtesy copies of all affidavits shall be given to the judge within the 
time limits required by the Rules of Civil Procedure. Copies shall be clearly 
marked as courtesy copies and indicate the hearing date. Courtesy copies 
shall not be filed with the clerk of the court. 
(8) Decision on a motion shall be rendered without a hearing unless re-
quested by the Court, in which event the Clerk shall schedule a date and time 
for such hearing. If a hearing is not requested by the Court, counsel shall 
notify the Clerk of the C >urt, in writing, to submit the motion to the Court for 
decision. The notification shall contain a certificate of mailing to opposing 
counsel and parties. 
(9) In cases where the granting of a motion would dispose of the action or 
any issues therein on the merits with prejudice, the party resisting the motion 
may request a hearing and such request shall be granted unless the motion is 
summarily denied. If no request is made within ten (10) days of notifying the 
clerk to submit the motion for decision, a hearing on the motion shall be 
deemed waived. 
(10) All motions for summary judgment or other dispositive motions shall 
be heard at least thirty (30) days before the scheduled trial date. No disposi-
tive motions shall be heard after that date without leave of the Court. 
(11) The court on its own motion or at a party's request may direct argu-
ments of any motion by telephone conference without court appearance. A 
verbatim record shall be made of all telephone arguments and the rulings 
thereon if requested by counsel. 
Rule 4-504, Written orders, judgments and decrees. 
Intent: 
To establish a uniform procedure for submitting written orders, judgments, 
and decrees to the court. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to all courts of record and not of record. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) In all rulings by a court, counsel for „he party or parties obtaining the 
ruling shall within fifteen (15) days, or within a shorter time as the court may 
direct, file with the court a proposed order, judgment, or decree in conformity 
with the ruling. 
(2) Copies of the proposed findings, judgments, and orders shall be served 
upon opposing counsel before being presented to the court for signature unless 
the court otherwise orders. Notice of objections shall be submitted to the court 
and counsel within (5) days after service. 
(3) Stipulated settlements and dismissals shall also he reduced to writing 
and presented to the court for signature within fifteen (15) days of the settle-
ment and dismissal. 
(4) Upon entry of judgment, notice of such judgment shall be served upon 
the opposing party and proof of such service shall be filed with the court. All 
judgments, orders, and decrees, or copies thereof, which are to be transmitted 
after signature by the judge, including other correspondence requiring a re-
ply, must be accompanied by pre-addressed envelopes and pre-paid postage. 
(5) All orders, judgments, and decrees shall be prepared in such a manner 
as to show whether they are entered upon the stipulation of counsel, the 
motion of counsel or upon the court's own initiative and shall identify the 
attorneys of record in the cause or proceeding in which the judgment, order or 
decree is made. 
(6) Except where otherwise ordered, all judgments and decrees shall con-
tain the address or the last known address of the judgment debtor and the 
social security number of the judgment debtor if known. 
(7) All judgments and decrees shall be prepared as separate documents and 
shall not include any matters by reference unless otherwise directed by the 
court. Orders not constituting judgments or decrees may be made a part of the 
documents containing the stipulation or motion upon which the order is 
based. 
(8) No orders, judgments, or decrees based upon stipulation shall be signed 
or entered unless the stipulation is in writing, signed by the attorneys of 
record for the respective parties and filed with the clerk or the stipulation was 
made on the record. 
(9) In all cases where judgment is rendered upon a written obligation to pay 
money and a judgment has previously been rendered upon the same written 
obligation, the plaintiff or plaintiff's counsel shall attach to the new com-
plaint a copy of all previous judgments based upon the same written obliga-
tion. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
KNIGHT ADJUSTMENT BUREAU, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JAMES R. WILLIAMS, 
Defendant. 
Comes now the defendant in the above entitled action, by and through 
counsel, and hereby objects to the plaintiff's Motion for Entry of Judgment 
and hereby requests that ihe Court deny the same based upon the following 
facts: 
1. There has been no order signed by the Court which would reflect the 
terms and conditions of the stipulation. 
2. Plaintiff's motion is not consistent with defendant's understanding 
of the stipulation. 
3. Robert L. Williams (named defendant in plaintiff's motion) wa3 
dismissed from this action in August of 1987 and is not a party to the present 
action or any stipulation entered into between the parties. 
4. There has been no written stipulation entered into between Knight 
Adjustment Bureau and James R. Williams which would comply with the terms and 
conditions of the oral stipulation. | 
5. Defendant James R. Williams understood that he would begin payments! 
FILMED 
^ 7 **•« *v 
.*/* 
OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR 
ENTRY OF JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 86-39441 
pursuant to the oral agreement upon receipt of an appropriate order or other 
written notice setting forth with specificity the payment terms and dates. 
6. Defendant understood that plaintifffs counsel was responsible for 
preparation of the appropriate order. 
7. Defendant has fully intended to comply with the oral agreement and 
has been prepared to tender payment consistent therewith, and has in fact 
tendered a sum that would render all payments current according to plaintiff's 
understanding. 
Dated this day of January, 1989. 
D- PAC^ <£(L^ 
D. Bruce Oliver 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
- — i 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing this _j ' day 
of January, 1989, to Kathryn Schuler Denholm, attorney for plaintiff, at 263 
East 2100 South, Satl Lake City, Utah 8H115. 
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KATHRYN SCHULER DENHOLM 0866 l~ " tCJ ~* '" II' 33 
Attorney for Plaintiff r 
263 East 2100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 OV v^ 
Telephone: 484-0091 . ,~ 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
KNIGHT ADJUSTMENT BUREAU * VERIFIED MOTION FOR 
A Utah Corporation * ENTRY OF JUDGMENT 
Plaintiff * 
vs * 
* 
ROBERT L. WILLIAMS * Civil No. 86-39441 
* 
Defendant * 
On September 16, 1988, Plaintiff appearing by counsel, 
Kathryn Denholm, and Defendant appearing personally and by 
counsel, Bruce Oliver, entered into a stipulation in the 
presence of the court wherein the Defendant agreed to pay to 
Plaintiff the sum of $15,000.00 with a first payment of 
$6,000 on or before October 16, 1988 together with other 
promises contained in the stipulation attached hereto and 
included herein by reference. 
That Defendant failed to make the first payment but 
that he paid $5,000 on or about November 17, L988 and has 
made no payments thereafter. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for entry of judgment as 
follows: principal balance, $31,987.30; prejudgment 
interest, $23,687.07; court costs, $101.40; attorney fees, 
51,275.00 for a total of $57,050.77 minus one payment of 
$5,000, judgment balance $52,050.77 together with interest 
FILMED 
a t the l e g a l r a t e of 12%. 
DATED t h i s / - p day of jJajfruar 
VERIPICA 
Appeared before me this I^ TTv fay
 0f January, 1989, 
Kathryn Schuler Denholm, who affirmed that she signed the 
above Verified Motion for Entry of Judgment and that the 
information contained therein is true and correct to her 
knowledge and belief. 
\Cozt\i 
Notary Pu 
Salt Lake County, 
$-ic,residing at; 
County, Utah. 
KATHRYN SCHULER DENHOLM 0866 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
263 East 2100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Telephone: 484-0091 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
KNIGHT ADJUSTMENT BUREAU 
A Utah Corporation 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
ROBERT L. WILLIAMS, 
Defendant. 
This matter came for trial before the Honorable Douglas 
Cornaby on the 16th day of September, 1988. Plaintiff 
appeared by counsel, Kathryn Denholm; Defendant appeared 
personally and by counsel, Bruce Oliver. Based upon 
stipulation of the parties made in open court, it is agreed 
as follows: 
1. Defendant shall pay to Plaintiff., on or before 
October 16, 1988, the sum of $6,000.00. In addition thereto, 
Defendant shall pay to Plaintiff an additional $9,101.00 
over a period of two (2) years with interest at the rate of 
11%. Payment shall commmence November 15, 1988, in the sum 
of $424.18. 
2. In the event Defendant becomes more than thirty (30) 
days in arrears of any payment, Plaintiff may, on it's 
* STIPULATION 
* 
* 
* Civil No. 86-39441 
* 
* 
ex-parte motion and affiavit, have judgment for the unpaid 
balance of the original prayer of the Complaint. 
DATED this day of , 1988. 
Bruce Oliver 
Attorney for Defendant 
KATHRYN SCHULER DENHOLM 0866 
Attorney for Plaintiff \"? rpp i #.. n. 09 
263 East 2100 South '" WJ l '',,l*wd 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
 L _ ; 
Telephone: 484-0091 . 
VsA . 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
KNIGHT ADJUSTMENT BUREAU * JUDGMENT 
A Utah Corporation * 
Plaintiff * 
* 
vs * 
* 
ROBERT L. WILLIAMS * Civil No. 86-39441 
Defendant * 
Plaintiff's Verified Motion for Entry of Judgment came 
before the Court, the Court being fully advised and good 
cause appearing, it it Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed: 
Plaintiff is awarded a judgment against Defendant in 
the prinpcipal sum of $31,987.30 together with pre-judgment 
interest in the sum of $23,687.07, court costs in the sum of 
$101.40 and attorney fees in the sum of $1,275.00 for a 
total of $57,050.77 minus one payment of $5,000 for a 
judgment total of $52,050.77 together with interest at the 
legal rate of 12%. 
DATED this 3/ day of c^* ^ * ^, , 1989. 
BY THB-^COURT: /* 
^ / ^ / 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing 
iUflBfjOT EM'EBELi ap.E™
 F ,L M E D 
Judgment to Bruce Oliver, 
South Main, Bountiful, Utah 
January, 1989. 
Attorney for Defendant, at 505 
84010 on this JQ day of 
Secretary 
SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
332 STATE CAPITOL 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114 
April 18, 1989 
OFFICE OF THE CLERK 
l&L 'I-
ALYSON BROWN 
CLERK OF THE COURT 
P. O. BOX 618 
FARMINGTON, UTAH 84025 
Knight Adjustment Bureau, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Robert L. Williams and James R. 
Williams, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Dist. Ct. No. 86-39441 
Supreme Ct. No.—%&&&&&— 
Respondent's Motion to amend judgment denied. Case is removed 
to district court for the limited purpose of allowing appellee 
the opportunity of making a similar motion to amend in that 
count. 
Geoffrey J. Butler 
Clerk 
*\v ^ 
DIUMENTI & LINDSLEY 
William H. Lindsley #1966 
Attorney for Defendants 
505 South Main Street 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Telephone: 292-0447 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
KNIGHT ADJUSTMENT BUREAU, 
Plaintiff, RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S 
: RULE 60 MOTION TO AMEND 
VS. 
ROBERT L. WILLIAMS and JAMES R. Civil No. 86-39441 
WILLIAMS, : 
Defendants. : 
Defendants in the above entitled matter respond to plaintiff's Rule 
60 Motion to Amend as follows: 
1. Plaintiff's acknowledge that the judgment was entered in error 
and have accordingly pursued an appeal to the final judgment; the matter has 
been remanded with the single purpose of addressing whether the error was 
"clerical." 
2. Plaintiff's belated assertion that the error was "clerical" (see 
Rule 60(a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure) is inconsistent with the history 
and record in this case: 
(1) Plaintiff repeatedly drafted written stipulations referring to 
"Robert Williams" which were rejected specifically because, inter aliaf the 
improper identification of defendant; numerous communications were had 
relative thereto. (It should be noted that Robert Williams is James 
Williams' father, and as plaintiff was well aware Robert has substantially 
B'f ifi 
far more assets and is far more solvent than James.) 
(2) The written stipulation plaintiff submitted to the court 
identified the defendant party as "Robert L. Williams," 
(3) The verified motion submitted by plaintiff identified the 
defendant party as "Robert L. Williams." 
(4) Defendant's objection, in paragraphs three and four, stated: 
3. Robert L. Williams (named defendant in plaintiff's 
motion) was dismissed from this action in August of 1987 
and is not a party to the p r e s e n t a c t i o n or any 
stipulation altered into between the parties. 
4. There has been no written stipulation entered into 
between Knight Adjustment Bureau and James R. Williams 
which would comply with the terms and condtions of the 
oral stipulation. 
(5) To accept the error as having been "clerical" in nature it has 
to be the kind of error that a clerk or office worker would make, i. e. an 
error in a mathematical computation or an isolated typographical error. 
Herein, however, as paragraphs three and four of defendant's objection cited 
above illustrate, both plaintiff's counsel and the court were unequivocably 
and fully advised before the judgment was granted (assuming, of course, that 
either plaintiff's counsel or the court read or considered defendant's 
objection). 
3. Defendant James Williams has tendered payment consistent with the 
oral stipulation even though plaintiff has failed or refused to prepare or 
submit a written stipulation in accordance with the oral stipulation, which 
plaintiff has rejected. 
/ 
CONCLUSION 
The only question before the Court is whether the judgment signed by 
the Court was a "clerical" error. Defendant's objections timely submitted to 
the court prior to the signing of the judgment unequivocally identified that 
Robert Williams has previously been dismissed from the lawsuit. Clearly the 
error was not merely "clerical" and although plaintiff should concur in 
setting aside the judgment it should not be amended pursuant to Rule 60(a) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil procedure. 
Dated this J day of May, 1989. 
^ # - / / : 
William H. Lindsley • - ^ 
Attorney for Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing this <> day 
of May, 1989, to Kathryn Schuler Denholm, attorney for plaintiff, at 263 
East 2100 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84115. 
In the Second Judicial District Court 
in and for the & 
County of Davis, State of Utah : - -
KNIGHT ADJUSTMENT BUREAU, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ] 
ROBERT L. WILLIAMS, et al., 
Defendants. 
RULING ON MOTION 
» TO AMEND JUDGMENT 
> Civil No. 39441 
The plaintiff's motion to amend the judgment came before the 
court for ruling pursuant to Rule 4-501 of the Code of Judicial 
Administration. The plaintiff is represented by Kathryn Denholm 
and the defendant is represented by William H. Lindsley and D. 
Bruce Oliver. 
The attorneys for the defendant, James R. Williams, do not 
object to the amendment but want us to know that both counsel for 
the plaintiff and the court were asleep since they objected to 
the naming of Robert L. Williams as the defendant in paragraph 3 
of their document of objection dated January 27, 1989. The court 
acknowledges that both counsel and the court failed to correct 
the mistake. The court does not find any ill will or improper 
purpose in the use of the wrong name. 
The motion to amend the judgment is granted pursuant to Rule 
60(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The plaintiff is ordered to draw a formal order consistent 
with this ruling together with an amended judgment. 
Dated May 26, 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
Certificate of Mailing: 
This is to certify that the undersigned mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Ruling to Kathryn S. Denholm, 263 
East 2100 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84115; D. Bruce Oliver, 505 
South Main Street, Bountiful, Utah 84010; and William H. 
Lindsley, 505 South Main Street, Bountiful, Utah 84010 on May 30, 
1989. 
Deputy Glerk 
PBlHRYN DENHOLM 0866 
//Attorney for P la in t i f f 
P.O. Box 520308 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
DAVIS C'ln-Tv, ijJAH 
JUHZ! 8 35 area 
«JU^ Si5i.£LiIlJ^ Lj^ Ml 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, DAffiS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KNIGHT ADJUSTMENT BUREAU 
A Utah Corporation 
Plaintiff 
AMENDED JUDGMENT 
vs 
JAMES R. WILLIAMS 
Defendant Civil No. 86-39441 
Plaintiff's Verified Motion for Entry of Judgment came before the Court, 
the Court being fully advised and good cause appearing, it is Ordered, Adjudged 
and Decreed: 
Plaintiff is awarded a judgment against Defendant in the principal sum 
of $31,987.30 together with pre-judgment interest in the sum of $23,687.07, 
court costs in the sum of $101.40 and attorney fees in the sum of $1,275.00 
for a total of $57,050.77 minus one payment of $5,000 for a judgment total of 
$52,050.77 together with interest at the legal rate of 12%. 
DATED this yi. c day of < '"' 
BY THE/€0URT: 
1989. 
/ 
JUDGE^ ' ~ V '"' / 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing Judgment to D. 
Bruce Oliver, 505 South Main Street, Bountiful, Utah 84010 and William H. 
Lindsley, 505 South Main Street, Bountiful, Utah 84010, Attorneys for the 
Defendant, on this L£- ' ~' day °f June, 1989. 
Defendants address: 
35 East 2200 South 
Bountiful, Utah 840D0 
/ 
e^fcretary 
J U L I ^ L i cMlciildiJ 
•to 31 9 23 jj| «0j 
In the Second Judicial District Court 
in and for the t!C...; • .-.. 
County of Davis, State of Utah c v _ M 
KNIGHT ADJUSTMENT BUREAU, ) 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROBERT L. WILLIAMS, et al., ; 
Defendants. ] 
! RULING ON 
TO STRIKE 
I Civil No. 
MOTION 
39441 
This matter comes before this court on defendants motion to 
strike with William H. Lindsley representing the defendant and 
Kathryn S. Denholm representing the plaintiff. The defendant is 
requesting oral argument. 
The defendant is not entitled to oral argument on this 
motion pursuant to Rule 4-501 of the Code of Judicial 
Administration. The defendant's motion is simply an extension of 
the argument the defendant made prior to May 26, 1989, wherein 
the court granted the plaintiff's motion to amend. The court 
granted the motion to amend the judgment pursuant to Rule 60(a) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
On August 13, 1987, the court signed an order allowing the 
plaintiff to file an amended complaint wherein the defendant 
would be James R. Williams and not Robert L. Williams. On August 
26, 1987, the court signed an order amending the complaint and an 
amended complaint was filed on August 27, 1987. Thereafter, all 
court documents showed the defendant to be James R. Williams 
until the plaintiff submitted the motion for entry of judgment 
which was filed on February 1, 1989. The defendant, James R. 
Williams, appeared for pre-trial on April 25, 1988, and again on 
May 23, 1988. He was also present for trial on September 16, 
1988. At each appearance he was represented by counsel. On 
September 16, 1988, rather than proceed to trial the parties 
stipulated to a settlement before the court. The court has 
reviewed the stipulation. The defendant, James R. Williams, 
personally stated to the court that he was agreeing to the 
stipulation as stated. There can be no question about who the 
proper defendant was. 
Rule 60(a) provides: 
"Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts 
of the record...may be corrected by the court at any time of 
its own initiative or on motion of any party... 
The defendant's conclusion to his May 5, 1989, brief stated: 
"The only question before the Court is whether the 
judgment signed by the Court was a 'clerical" error..." 
This court is convinced that plaintiff's "Verified Motion 
for Entry of Judgment" was a clerical error. Based on that 
judgment the court ruled on the motion to amend on May 26, 1989, 
and recognized that both counsel for the plaintiff and the Court 
had failed to correct the error. 
In the motion to strike the defendant still denies clerical 
errors, but also raises other issues. He claims the oral 
stipulation by the defendant "did not contain the precise details 
of the agreement, which plaintiff was to prepare and submit to 
defendant's counsel and then to the Court." This is contrary to 
the stipulation itself. The stipulation was clear. The parties 
personally and through counsel stated that they understood 'the 
agreement and that it would be binding on them. It made no 
reference to a writing or a future approval of that writing. The 
court did instruct the plaintiff to draw a judgment, which was 
not done. This does not mean that it cannot be done later 
without the agreement of the defendant. 
The defendant's motion to strike is denied. The judgment 
will stand. 
The plaintiff is ordered to draw a formal order consistent 
with this ruling. 
Dated July 27, 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
^JUDG^w: 
Certificate of Mailing: 
This is to certify that the undersigned mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Ruling to Kathryn Denholm, P. 0. 
Box 520308, Salt Lake City, Utah 84152 and William H. Lindsley, 
505 South Main Street, Bountiful, Utah 84010 on July 28, 1989. 
Deputy C^ /erk 
ADDENDUM 
Transcript of Pretrial April 25, 1988 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL I)! STR I CT COURT 
IN AND I'OR DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OP UTAH 
-ollo-
KNIC.MT ADJUSTMENT BUREAU, 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
v s. 
ROBERT I,. WILLIAMS, 
Do fondant . 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT 01 
PROCEEDINGS 
Civil No. 3 9 MI 
HE IT REMEMBERED Mini- on Monday, April 7'\, l')RK, I 
above-entitled matter earn < on for PRETRIAL in I: ho Second 
Judicial District Court, in and for Davis County, State of 
Utah, before the HONORABLE DOUCLAS L COENABY, Presidvnq. 
* * * 
A P P E A R A N C E S : 
For the Plaintiff 
Eor the Defendant. 
KATHRYN DENHOLM 
Attorney at Law 
6 60 South 200 East 
Suite 100 
Sa I t Lake Ci ty, Utah P.! I I 
'WILLIAM II. LINDSLEY 
A I torney a t Law 
r>0r> South Main Street 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Man.-7 li. Davis, C.S.R 
THE COURT: Record can show we are meeting in the 
matter of Knight Adjustment Bureau versus Robert L. Williams. 
Counsel, identify yourself for the record. 
MISS DENHOLM: Kathryn Denholm appearing for the 
plaintiff. 
MR. LINDSLEY: William Lindsley appearing wibh 
James Williams, your Honor. 
THE COURT: And you are Robert Williams? 
MR. LINDSLEY: No. James Williams. 
THE COURT: What does he have to do with it? 
MISS DENHOLM: Robert Williams has been dismissed 
out and James has been substituted. 
THE COURT: Let's go to the plaintiff, first, and 
you tell me what the issues are from your client's point of 
view. 
MISS DENHOLM: Your Honor, this is an account on a 
contract for materials and goods purchased for use by Williams 
operating at this time as K and W Distributing. We have a 
personal guarantee on contract that was dated April of 1979 
and the account continued for several years thereafter. There 
is a principal balance of approximately $33,000 on the 
account. That's based on the invoices. 
THE COURT: Is that the only issue? 
MISS DENHOLM: There would also be attorney fees. 
THE COURT: Mr. Lindsley. 
2 
onl 
we 
No. 
tha 
MR. LINDSLEY: 
y additional matters 
set out in 
THE 
MR. 
3, is thai 
our Answer 
That is the issue, your Honor. The 
would be the affirmative defenses that 
to the Amended Complaint. J 
COURT: Meaning what? J 
LINDSLEY: 
t the statu 
Well, No. 2, that's a general denial. 
te of limitations has been barred by 
t. We claim it's bc.rred by-- J 
THE COURT: Well, statute of limitations—this is a 
fairly clear open accoun 
on 
mot 
do 
to 
pre 
that? 
MR. 
ion today. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
it. This 
LINDSLEY: 
t. What's the date of the last charge 
Well, I am not prepared to argue the 
COURT: What motion? I don't have any motions. 
LINDSLEY: 
COURT: Oh 
is the time 
know exactly why you 
trial is f< 
down informat 
def 
its 
a p 
you 
MR. 
Dr, not jus 
ion. 
LINDSLEY: 
Well, to argue the defenses. I 
, you must. This is the time when we 
when I put you up against your task 
are going to trial. That's what a 1 
t for me to get, you know, to write 1 
Well, I'm not prepared to present the 1 
enses today, your Honor. Plaintiff hasn't even presented 
case in chief. 
THE 
retrial is 
COURT: But, you don't understand. That's what 
I want to know really the differences between 
two. When you com6 to pretrial I want to say, what is 
3 
your claim. I want to look at plaintiffs and say, what's your 
claim and if they say—and they have said it. They said 
things. You owe us about $33,000 on a personal guarantee and 
I say to myself, oh, personal guarantee. That means it's for 
corporate or some business entity. They are guaranteeing they 
are going to pay. What's the defense to it, and you say to 
me, the defense is the statute of limitations and I say, all 
right, to myself, well, and on an open account it's six years 
on a written account and it's four years on an open account 
and six years on a written account, you see, on a written 
notice. 
So, I'm going to force you right into every single 
issue because I want to know what is really at issue here. We 
don't wait to trial. We find out right now. If we wait until 
we go to trial, you see, then we draw sanctions against you, 
if we find out we wasted everybody's time. 
Now, that's the reason I'm asking. That's why you 
have to be prepared to answer the questions today. 
MISS DENHOLM: Your Honor, the last time that the 
defendants charged against anything on the account was October 
of 1984. The business was involuntarily dissolved by the 
Secretary of State in December of 1984. 
THE COURT: Okay. Now, the last property delivered 
was October of '84. 
MISS DENHOLM: That's right. 
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THE COURT: It was filed in May of '86. It's only 
two years. What's the defense to that? 
MR. LINDSLEY: Well, your Honor, we haven't—our 
defense goes to the--we don't believe plaintiff is going to be j 
able to prove the deliveries in '84 or '83. 1 
THE COURT: Well, tell me why not. Tell me why they 
can't prove that. You know, to me, it's fairly simple. There 
either is or there isn't. If they are falsifying records to 
try to get it in under the statute of limitations, I want to 
know about that, too, you see. J 
MR. LINDSLEY: Well, your Honor, if you give me 15 
minutes maybe to round up our witnesses and we can put on our 
case before plaintiff even puts on their case. 
THE COURT: No. You are missing the point of the 
pretrial. The point of a pretrial is—I want to take those 
matters that are not honestly disputed and I want to get them J 
out so that when we go to trial, if you say you have statute 
of limitations, I want to know that it's statute of I 
limitations and then I am prepared to look for statute of 
limitations. And if you say accord and satisfaction, then 
when I go to court I'm looking for accord and satisfaction. 
You didn't say that. I am using an example. 
So, we won't waste everybody's time, you see, by 
going to court and saying—I can read the Complaint. I can 
see the Answer. I can see this and this and this and this. 
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I can see that you say those things, but, you know, 95 percent 
of the cases, by the.time I get to the point we are at now, 1 
then they will tell me what real 1y--after they have done their 1 
research, after they have done discovery, they can tell me J 
what the real defenses are. J 
Now, if you are not prepared to do that today, let's 
put a new pretrial. Give them their attorney fee and we will 
come back and do it a month. 1 
MR. LINDSLEY: We are prepared to go to trial today. 
THE COURT: Then be prepared to answer my questions 
today. J 
MR. LINDSLEY: I am prepared to answer your I 
questions. First thing is, we dispute each and every 1 
allegation of the Complaint. 1 
THE COURT: I understand. Tell me what your J 
evidence is going to be about the statute of limitations since 1 
that is the question that we are on. 1 
Let me switch it to you. You claim there's a I 
purchase in 1984 under this agreement. 1 
MISS DENHOLM: That's correct, your Honor. J 
THE COURT: What evidence do you have? 1 
MISS DENHOLM: We have a corresponding invoice. J 
1 THE COURT: Okay. Pull one out and let's look at 
it. Now, you have access to this, I assume, haven't you, 
Mr. Lindsley? 
MR. LINDSLEY: We could have through discovery if we 
wanted to. We tried to limit the attorney fees. 
MISS DENHOLM: This isn't the '84 one, but— 
THE COURT: What's the date on that one? 
MISS DENHOLM: This is November of '83. 
THE COURT: Still within the four-year period. 
Okay. 
MISS DENHOLM: We have the signature. 
THE COURT: What's the signature? 
MISS DENHOLM: James R. Williams signed as vice 
president. The agreement, as being a separate document. 
There's a list of items and it's signed as having been 
received. 
THE COURT: Now, what's the defense, then, for the 
statute of limitations? Will we be wasting our time with that 
defense? 
MR. LINDSLEY: I am not prepared to look at that at 
this moment, your Honor. My point is this. That there's a 
corporate entity that had an open account with the plaintiff 
for a period of time. Sometime prior—and I am not certain of 
the date, but the statute of limitations has expired. The 
corporate entity went to a cash on delivery. 
THE COURT: Now, you have a guarantee. 
MISS DENHOLM: Yes, we do. 
THE COURT: Was there ever a cancellation of the 
guarantee? 
MISS DENHOLM: No. 
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of all, first defense is J 
Williams. 
COURT: Okay. Let me see the guarantee. 
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MR. WILLIAMS: It could be my signature. 
THE COURT: Does it look to be somebody else's 
signature? 
MR. WILLIAMS: Probably not. 
THE COURT: Then that's not a defense, is it? 
MR. LINDSLEY: In the admissions we denied that 
that's a personal guarantee. 
THE COURT: That doesn't matter. What I'm trying to 
keep you, counsel--you are going to wind up with sanctions. 
You know, if you tell me—I don't mind—if you honestly tell 
me that's a defense and that's not his signature and we go to 
court on that basis—but if we go to court and I find out you 
are just pulling my leg when I get there, somebody is going to 
be in contempt of court because we are not going to waste our 
time in court on things the.t are really not contested. 
We have got past the age in trying cases where we 
just say, you know, I am not going to pay this thing. You 
know, if we honestly believe that is not your signature, you 
see, then we want to try that. We are going to say to that 
other party, you are going to have to prove that that is his 
signature so what they are going to do, they are going to pull 
a bunch of other signatures out and maybe even have an expert. 
I don't know. We are going to make them prove it. We are 
going to make them have whatever experts they need to prove. 
But, if they come and prove it or bring their 
9 
people to prove and fchey say, well, that's really not a J 
contention, then we are going to turn around—we are not going 
to put sanctions against you, but one of you may be in 
contempt of court for it because we are not here to play J 
games. We are here to find out the truth, what the 
relationship is between the parties and if you don't owe them 
a dime, then that's the way this case is going to come out. 
On the other hand, if you owe them $33,000, then you 
are going to pay $33,000 without all of the necessity of J 
playing games. J 
MR. LINDSLEY: Well, I don't believe Mr. Williams is 
capable of paying anywhere near 33,000. I 
THE COURT: Doesn't matter. 
MR. LINDSLEY: There may be a judgment. J 
THE COURT: It doesn't matter if he can't pay a J 
dime. That's not what we are here for; do you understand I 
that, Mr. Williams? A trial is not to decide what you can 
pay, only what you contracted to pay since this is a contract. I 
MR. LINDSLEY: Our office has reviewed exhaustively 
Mr. Williams. What the Court was looking at is a guarantee 
that was allegedly signed nine years ago and— J 
THE COURT: I understand. 
MR. LINDSLEY: And we deny that that Ls a personal 
guarantee and we can test that issue. We reviewed it with 
Mr. Williams. That under the Rule of Civil Procedure that 1 
10 
if, in fact, because v/e denied, pursuant to the request for 
admissions, if the plaintiff is put to having to prove it and 
does prove that, that tho Court could impose sanctions, 
plaintiff's costs, additional costs. We reviewed that with 
Mr. Williams but we contest that issue. 
THE COURT: That's fine. But, you understand if ho 
says it looks like my signature and it looks like all other 
signatures, I want to guarantee that you, as counsel, you may 
go to jail if you just waste our time in there. You cannot 
waste time just because you want to waste time. 
MR. LINDSLEY: We are not prepared to admit that is 
a personal guarantee signed by Mr. Williams, your Honor. We 
recognize sanctions are provided for by Rules of Civil 
Procedure. If the Court is advising me that I will be in 
contempt of court because we are not prepared to admit, with 
sanctions of contempt of court, possibly we ought to continue 
this pretrial hearing and get an interlocutory appeal. 
THE COURT: You will not get any interlocutory 
appeal. There is no such thing on a matter of this nature. 
MR. LINDSLEY: Your Honor— 
THE COURT: No. Listen to me. Now, I run these 
pretrials and I am going to run them the way I am supposed to 
run them. These pretrials are not a game. These pretrials 
are for me to find out what the issues are and when I ask you 
if that's an issue, you just tell me~-you tell me it's 
I I 
I 
1 honestly an issue. 
2 MR. LINDSLEY: I am telling you it's an issue and 
3 I am not going to be setting here and be threatened with going 
4 to jail. 
5 THE COURT: Yes, you will. 
6 MR. LINDSLEY: Because we deny and we do not admit 
7 the contention— 
8 THE COURT: Yes, you will. 
9 MR. LINDSLEY: Wellr I will not, your Honor. Excuse 
10 me. May I be excused? 
H THE COURT: No. Have the Bailiff come in here. You 
X2 sit down. 
13 (Whereupon, the Bailiff entered the Court's 
14 chambers.) 
15 THE COURT: Bailiff, come in here a minute, will 
16 you? Sit down €here and if Mr. Lindsley needs to go to jail 
17 you can go right away. You are not going to walk out of any 
18 pretrial. 
19 MR. LINDSLEY: Your Honor, I would ask to be 
20 excused. 
21 THE COURT: You cannot be excused. You are going to 
22 sit through this pretrial and we are going to find out what 
23 the issues really are. 
24 MR. LINDSLEY: Your Honor, at this point, your 
25 Honor, having been threatened with going to jail because I 
12 
contest an issue in this case, I don't believe that I am 
emotionally in a state of mind to continue the pretrial. 
THE COURT: Okay. Let's do it this way. You want 
to pay her a hundred and fifty dollars? Is that a fair and 
reasonable attorney fee for coining? 
MISS DENHOLM: That would be reasonable, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Now, you come from where? 
MISS DENHOLM: Salt Lake. 
THE COURT: It took you how long to get here? 
MISS DENHOLM: About 40 minutes. 
THE COURT: And it's about the same period of time 
back. 
MISS DENHOLM: Yes. 
THE COURT: And you work at what amount? We have 
been here for only 20 minutes now, so that makes roughly, oh, 
almost two hours. 
MISS DENHOLM: I bill at $85 an hour. 
THE COURT: Okay. One hundred and fifty dollars is 
a fair amount, then. You want to pay her $150 for an attorney 
fee, we will continue it for a month and you can come back 
prepared to pre-try it. That's the option. 
MR. WILLIAMS: That is what I would like to do. 
THE COURT: When you come back, I'm going to ask you 
exactly the same questions and I want answers to them, you 
see. I won't let you out. What I am objecting to is coming 
13 
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appears to be in writing. 
So, we are talking about a six-year statute of 
limitations. Sof we go back six years prior to the time that 
it's filed. We are talking about May 27th of 1980. Then we 
back off to that particular date and if I don't do these kind 
of things, pretrials are worthless. If I ask you questions 
about them and you seem to just not be giving me an answer— 
just, well, that's the way I said it so that's the way it has 
got to be, then that's not satisfactory to the Court. 
So, with that explanation, give us another date for 
the pretrial. 
TFIE CLERK: May 23rd at 10:45. 
THE COURT: May 23rd at 10:45. 
MISS DENHOLM: Is that Monday morning? 
THE .COURT: That's a Monday. We will put it on the 
calendar then. 
MISS DENHOLM: Your Honor, may we make payment of 
attorney fees conditional upon continuing with their defense? 
THE COURT: Conditioned on what? 
MISS DENHOLM: Would you want to impose sanctions 
if— 
THE COURT: I want it to be paid before we come back 
to pretrial. 
MISS DENHOLM: And if they fail to pay i t — 
THE COURT: We will take care of that matter. Okay. 
1 C 
You have your continuance. That's all today. 
MISS DENHOLM: Okay. Thank you. 
(Whereupon, the proceedings were concluded.) 
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THE COURT: The matter on the calendar this morning is 
Kinght Adjustment Bureau versus James R. Williams, Civil 
Number 39441. 
Who is going to make the presentation? 
MS- DENHOLM: 1 will, your Honor. 
Your Honor, we have reached a settlement agreement 
in this matter. We have agreed that the defendant will pay 
to my client the sum of $15,000 plus court costs $101.50 and 
a $500 attorney fee that will be on the following terms: 
He will pay $6,000 principal within 30 days. He 
will also pay the $500 attorney fee and $101.50 court costs 
within 30 days. The balance of $9,000 will be paid over 
two years plus 11-percent interest. We estimate the payments 
to be about $500 a month. 
In the event the defendant is in default of any 
payment by more than 30 days, the plaintiff will be entitled 
to entry of a judgment as prayed in the complaint upon 
affidavit. 
THE COURT: Less everything that's already been paid, of 
course. 
MS. DENHOLM: That's right. 
THE COURT: Is that your understanding of it, Counsel? 
MR. OLIVER: With one exception, if I can just speak 
1 with Ms. Denholm for one second, your Honor. 
2 (Discussion held off the record between 
3 counsel.) 
4 MR. OLIVER: Your Honor, just one minor adjustment on 
5 that. That is with regard to the relief of pray for 
6 complaint. He would be confessing to a judgment as to the 
7 principal amount only and not to any interest or otherwise 
8 that is claimed there. 
9 THE COURT: Okay. When you say principal, are you 
10 talking about the amount stated at $31,987.30. 
11 MR. OLIVER: That's correct, your Honor. 
12 MS. DENHOLM: We would anticipate as well that a 
13 reasonable attorney fee might be awarded in the default. 
14 MR. OLIVER: We have no objections. 
15 THE COURT: Attorney fees of these kind are continuing. 
16 We used to give them an attorney fee that was really far more 
17 than what's currently done justified with the thought that 
18 there's going to be work in the future. 
19 But now we've tried to slow that down and let you 
20 supplement that from time to time on an attorney fee basis so 
21 that you're being paid ultimately but not any more than what 
22 you have done. 
23 I MS. DENHOLM: Okay. 
24 THE COURT: All right. You're with Knight Adjustment, I 
25 assume? 
I 
1 MS. DENHOLM: It's Mr. Carlson. He's a representative 
2 of Knight's assignor. 
3 THE COURT: Of what? 
4 MS. DENHOLM: Robinson Distributor, who is the assignor. 
5 THE COURT: Well, we normally ask: Is he the one that 
6 can make the decision here? 
7 MS. DENHOLM: Yes. He has the authority to approve the 
8 settlement. 
9 THE COURT: Do you want to state your name? 
10 MR. CARLSON: Douglas S. Carlson. 
11 THE COURT: You understand what counsel has stated to 
12 the Court? 
13 MR. CARLSON: In terms of the interest that — 
14 THE COURT: Everything. You heard the agreement, didn't 
15 you? 
16 MR. CARLSON: Yeah. We decided that we were going to 
17 waive the interest? 
18 MS. DENHOLM: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
19 MR. CARLSON: My understanding was that he will not 
20 default. And so the fact that we keep the interest or not is 
21 not really — I mean, I think it should stay because he's not 
22 going to default on this. 
23 MS. DENHOLM: Okay. I misunderstood what you said 
24 previously, then. You're not agreeing to waive the interest? 
25 MR. CARLSON: The interest, I mean, 31,000 or 50,000, 
1 it's all relative to his ability to meet his agreement with 
2 us and so..•. 
3 MS. DENHOLM: Yeah. Uh-huh (affirmative). 
4 Apparently, your Honor, I misunderstood my client's 
5 statement earlier. He's not approving the discount of the 
6 interest. That's a matter we didn't discuss before we came. 
7 THE COURT: Do you want me to leave again and let you 
8 talk some more, or do you want to start trial? I don't care 
9 which. 
10 MR. OLIVER: Your Honor, in discussing this this morning 
11 between counsel, and I represented to my client -- She had 
12 indicated that they take a confession of judgment or take a 
13 judgment on the 31,000 in the event of default with the 
14 30-days grace period. And that's what I represented to my 
15 client. I had no problem with that. He accepted that. 
16 When she indicated that they would take judgment 
17 based upon the complaint, of course, the complaint asks for 
18 interest, and I think it's something that we could probably 
19 talk about and probably resolve in just a matter of a couple 
20 of minutes. But I don't see where interest is provided for 
21 in the contract initially. And the contract, indeed, was 
22 valid, but I still don't see where it provides for interest. 
23 It provides for attorney fees, but I don't see where interest 
24 is included. 
25 THE COURT: Let me get out of your negotiation. You 
1 chat with each other. Let me know when you're ready for me 
2 to come back in. 
3 I (Recess.) 
4 THE COURT: Anything different? 
5 MR. OLIVER: No, your Honor. He'll go as we stated by 
6 I Ms- Denholm, to the degree that judgment can be granted as 
7 prayed for in the complaint. 
B THE COURT: What about the interest problem? 
9 MR. OLIVER: That's part of what's stated in the 
10 complaint, so we're conceding and going with her statement. 
11 THE COURT: Okay. 
12 Is that your understanding of what the agreement 
13 is? 
14 MR. CARLSON: Yes. 
15 THE COURT: Is that your agreement? 
16 MR. CARLSON: Yes, your Honor. 
17 THE COURT: Mr. Williams, is that as stated according 
18 your agreement? 
19 MR. WILLIAMS: Yes, Your Honor. 
20 THE COURT: And that is your agreement? 
21 MR. WILLIAMS: Yes, your Honor. 
22 THE COURT: The Court will adopt that as a stipulation 
23 of the parties. Who is going to draw the judgment? 
24 I MS. DENHOLM: I'll draw the documents, your Honor. 
25 THE COURT: That's all, then. Thank you. 
(Whereupon, the proceedings were concluded.) 
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